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Abstract We describe the computation which resulted in the title of
this paper Furthermore we give an analysis of the data collected during
this computation From these data we derive the important observation
that in the nal stages the progress of the double large prime variation
of the quadratic sieve integer factoring algorithm can more eectively
be approximated by a quartic function of the time spent than by the
more familiar quadratic function We also present as an update to  	
some of our experiences with the management of a large computation
distributed over the Internet Based on this experience we give some
realistic estimates of the current readily available computational power
of the Internet We conclude that commonlyused 	 bit RSA moduli
are vulnerable to any organization prepared to spend a few million dollars
and to wait a few months
  Introduction
One of the earliest descriptions of the RSA public key cryptosystem appeared in
Martin Gardners column Mathematical Games in the August 		 issue of Sci

entic American There the inventors of RSA presented the following challenge
Let
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be the public modulus and let e  	 be the public exponent nd the plaintext
English message which corresponds to the encrypted message
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where the original plaintext English message had been transformed into a dec

imal number using the transformation A   B      Z   with 
indicating a space between words It is readily veried that application of this
transformation to the title of this paper followed by an eth powering modulo r
results in the encrypted message Here we describe how we reversed this pro

cess and found the title of this paper thereby solving the RSA
challenge and
winning the US prize The prize has been donated to the Free Software
Foundation
The modulus r has  decimal digits and is according to  the product of a

digit prime p and a 
digit prime q such that both p  and q  are relatively
prime to e The primes p and q were kept secret It is well known that the
encrypted message can be decrypted by computing encrypted message
d
mod r
where d satises d e   mod p q  Because of the condition on p and q
nding d is straightforward if p q  is known But knowing p q 
is equivalent to knowing the secret primes p and q cf 

It follows that the
encrypted message can be decrypted by factoring r
In the full paper we will describe in detail how we managed to factor r
This extended abstract consists of a discussion of some historical remarks on the
supposed diculty of factoring r Section  an outline of the method that we
used to factor r Section  an overview of the analysis that will appear in the
full paper Section  a view behind the scenes of this world
wide computing
eort Section  and some concluding remarks Section 
 Predicting the diculty of factoring r
Back in 	 Richard Guy wrote I shall be surprised if anyone regularly factors
numbers of size 


without special form during the present century  In
		 Rivest estimated in  that factoring a 
digit number which is the
product of two 
digit prime numbers would require at least  quadrillion
years using the best factoring algorithm known assuming that a  b modc
could be computed in  nanosecond for 
digit numbers a b and c

Thus
it is not surprising that the inventors of RSA felt condent that with such a
huge modulus the message will never be recovered  and oered a  prize
to the rst successful decoder of the encrypted message Interestingly until the
message was decoded none of the parties involved remembered the expiration
date of April   given in  but not in 
With 
	
modular multiplications per second about 

can be carried
out in  quadrillion years It is not clear why back in 		 it was believed that
  

modular multiplications were required to factor a  or 
digit
number Unfortunately Rivest does not recall how he obtained his estimate
At that time Pollards rho method was probably the fastest available factoring

This does not imply that in order to decrypt the encrypted message it is necessary to
nd p and q but no faster way to decrypt an RSAencryption has yet been published

A similar estimate can be found in 
method for which a run
time analysis had been published To nd a prime factor
p it needs on average about 
p
p iterations where each iteration costs two
modular multiplications For a 
digit prime factor this amounts to at most
  

modular multiplications This suggests that Rivest might have used
the rho method but miscounted the number of zeros In that case the correct
estimate should have been  quadrillion years which still sounds suciently
impressive to convince people of the infeasibility of breaking 
digit RSA keys
Since 		 many new factoring algorithms have been invented and the avail

ability and speed of computing resources has changed dramatically Rivests
imaginary  nanosecond per modular multiplication machine however still
stretches the imagination With pipelining and special purpose hardware with
gate delays of about  picoseconds it might just be feasible even for 
digit
numbers If we were to build such a machine then we estimate that it has a
fair chance to nd the 
digit factor of r after  
 
modular multiplications
using the elliptic curve method ECM This would require two months 
quadrillion times faster than Rivests estimate  progress that is due solely to
improved factoring methods
Today nding 
digit prime factors using ECM is believed to be infeasible
On a Sparc  workstation the   
 
modular multiplications on 
digit
numbers that would probably be needed for ECM would take well in excess of
 years ECM uses mostly computations on local data which can be kept
in the cache and hardly any access to main memory Consequently the method
runs x times faster on a machine whose mips rating is x times better Therefore
a statement of the kind nding a 
digit prime factor of a 
digit number
using ECM would probably take more than half a million mips years might
make some sense Here we rate a Sparc  workstation at  mips notice that
this would imply a mips rating of about  million for Rivests imaginary machine
if it used ordinary 
bit arithmetic
For the quadratic sieve factoring algorithm QS the method that we used
to factor r run
times expressed in mips years are much harder to justify Siev

ing algorithms spend most of their time accessing more or less random locations
in memory On most workstations processor speed is poorly correlated with
memory speed and therefore the mips rating of the processor is not a reliable
measure of the expected performance of a sieving algorithm To give some exam

ples on a Sparc  workstation QS would have taken about  years to factor r
which leads to an estimate of about  mips years On a Dec  rated
at  mips we would have spent 	 years which translates into almost 
mips years On a Sun  however rated at  mips we would have spent
about  years but only 	 mips years Averaging over the machines that
were used and keeping in mind that we are indulging in energetic handwaving
we give a very approximate estimate of  to  mips years for the time
spent on the factorization of r If the ratio between memory and processor speed
of Rivests machine is not much worse than on current workstations it could
factor r in less than a day Even though expressing run
times in mips years is
far from ideal for memory
bound processes it is common practice in factoring
literature It provides a convenient way to compare and predict run
times of
factoring problems and to check the accuracy of theoretical predictions
Heuristically it can be argued that the expected run
time of QS behaves as
Ln  exp  o
p
logn log logn
for n   where n is the number to be factored Often one simply ignores
the o and interprets the resulting Ln as the number of operations needed
to factor n Since the o is neither  nor constant this practice hardly makes
sense
This naive approach was rst used in  Section IXA where Ln without
the o was given as the run
time of Schroeppels linear sieve factoring algo

rithm cf  This is a big improvement compared with Rivests slightly earlier
estimate in  The run
time from  did not include the matrix elimination
step because this step was considered to be trivial compared to the sieving step
cf  Including it would have increased the run
time to
expu  o
p
logn log logn
cf  Theorem  where a linear dependency in an s  s bit
matrix
can be found in time s
u
 At the time of the publication of  the best one
could do was u  	 Although for small n the matrix step is in practice
negligible compared to the sieving step this is not the case for the larger n
in  Table  thus making these values strictly speaking and disregarding
the o
issue incorrect for 	 It was later shown that the sparseness of the
matrix can be exploited and that u    o can indeed be used
This does not imply that there are any signicant digits in  Table 
The table illustrates however the approximate growth rate of Ln which can
be used in an attempt to predict run
times if factoring n
 
takes time t for
some QS
implementation and j logn

n
 
j is reasonably small then factoring
n

using the same implementation can be expected to take time approximately
t  Ln

Ln
 
 where both os are simply omitted
Using this method it was estimated in  that factoring a 
digit number
using QS would take about  mips years based on the observation from 
that factoring a 
digit number took about  mips years The actual 

digit factorization took about  mips years slightly less than the prediction
due to several improvements in the program and intentional suboptimality of
the parameter choices for the 
digit factorization Similar extrapolation of
the 
digit result to r would lead to about  mips years which is on the
low side of the  to  mips years that we spent This may be due to a
combination of two factors In the rst place the eect of the unknown behavior
of the o in the  digit jump from  to  digits is signicantly bigger
than in the jump from  to  digits Apparently neglecting the o leads
to an overly optimistic estimate Secondly the eects of small and relatively
slow memories should be even worse for r than for the 
digit factorization
from 
The reason why these deliberations are considered to be useful is that they
might help us to assess the security of widely
used 
bit RSA moduli Since
L
 
L
 	
   without the two os we nd that factoring a 
bit
RSA modulus using our current QS
implementation can probably not be done
in less than   mips years An upper bound is harder to give but a million
mips years is probably the right order of magnitude
We should stress that this estimate might not be a good indication of the
diculty to break a 
bit RSA modulus It tells us how hard it would probably
be for a fairly well understood reliable and by now rather ancient algorithm The
newer number eld sieve factoring algorithm NFS cf  is asymptotically
superior to QS Recent experiments have suggested that the crossover point
between QS and NFS lies well below  digits cf  	 but it remains to
be seen how well the memory requirements of NFS for 
bit numbers can be
handled In any case we suspect that with the factorization of r we have seen
the last big QS
factorization Furthermore given how hard it was 	 years ago
to make a decent prediction about the diculty of factoring r it is probably
better to avoid making any rm prediction about 
bit numbers
 Factoring r
We used the double large prime multiple polynomial variation of the quadratic
sieve factoring method QS to factor r The goal of QS is to nd pairs of integers
x y such that x

 y

mod r Because r divides x

 y

 x yxy we nd
that r  gcdr x y gcdr xy If the pairs are generated in a random fashion
then there is a probability of  that this factorization is non
trivial because
r has only two distinct prime factors  In QS pairs x y are constructed in
two steps the sieving step and the matrix step      We give an
outline of these steps as applied to r In the full paper we will give more details
 The sieving step
First we select amultiplier a small positive integerm such thatmr is a quadratic
residue modulo many small primes cf   Next we compute the factor
base P  consisting of   and the primes p 	 B
 
for which mr is a quadratic
residue modulo p for some bound B
 
 In the sieving step we collect a set of
relations integer tuples v q
 
 q

 e
p

p P
 such that
 v

 q
 
 q


Y
p P
p
e
p
mod r
where each q
i
is either  or a large prime 
 B
 
 B

 for some large prime
bound B

 If q
 
 q

  the relation is called full if only one of the q
i
equals 
it is a partial and a double partial otherwise If the large primes match the
double partial relations can be combined into cycles  The sieving step is
complete as soon as fullscycles P 
We used m   as multiplier Asymptotically the factor base size in QS ap

plied to n behaves as
p
Ln for n A factor base size of   elements
was close to optimal for the 
digit number RSA
 factored in  with mul

tiplier 	 Therefore a factor base of  
p
LmrL	 RSA
   
omitting both os elements should be reasonable but on the small side be

cause the o grows with n After experiments with other values we settled for
P       
 	
and B
 
    Our choice is certainly within
 of optimal and probably slightly suboptimal We felt that this was less un

desirable than the memory
related problems caused by an even larger choice

We used B

 



Based on our experience with many other factorizations we expected that
we would need about   fulls before we had enough cycles to complete the
sieving step Experiments indicated that this would take less than  mips
years More than  million relations would have to be collected since only  out
of every  	 is full using a program which would need approximately 
MBytes to run We opted for the idle
cycle collection method from  This
sounds easier than it was even though we could re
use the software because
our eort would need an order of magnitude more time memory and disk space
to run the sieving program and to store the relations We give more details of
the resource management in Section  We estimate that we had approximately
 contributors using more than  machines and producing about  of
the relations The other  was contributed by several MasPars running the
program from 
On March   we had about  million relations with more than
  fulls and 	  cycles Because  	     P  the
cease and desist message was mailed out on March  The nal counts on
March  were   fulls   	 partials and    double partials
for a total of    relations after less than  days of sieving The double
partials that could occur in cycles were written to tape by the rst author and
sent to the third by regular overnight mail They resulted in 	  cycles
constructed using the method from  With the fulls which were ftp
ed from
hotsparemitedu to flashbellcorecom via tbirdcciastateedu this
led to   sparse  
dimensional vectors e
p

p P
as in 
 The matrix step
Here we nd linear dependencies modulo  among the  P bit
vectors
e
p
mod 
p P
 Each dependency corresponds to a set W  fw e
p

p P
 
w


Q
p P
p
e
p
mod rg for which
P
W
e
p

p P
 w
p

p P
for integers w
p
 Con

sequently x 
Q
W
w mod r and y 
Q
p P
p
w
p
mod r satisfy x

 y

mod r

Because P   	  mod 
 
we could use the QSimplementation from  on a  K
MasPar massively parallel computer The choice is on the high side for this imple
mentation which performed noticeably worse than expected based on the experience
from 
To nd dependencies among the rows of the      bit
matrix
with on average  	 bits per row we intended to use the same approach
as in previous large scale factorizations The largest matrix processed so far
however had less than half the number of rows and columns    
with the same density cf  making the present eort an order of magnitude
more dicult Using structured Gaussian elimination cf    the matrix
was reduced to a dense      bit
matrix This took less than 
CPU
hours on a Sparc  workstation 	 of which was spent building the
    byte dense matrix in  separate les of about  MBytes each
To nd a dependency among the rows of the dense matrix we used the
incremental version from  of the MasPar dense matrix eliminator from 
The dense matrix was processed in  blocks With a core size of GByte  
rows could be processed per block Each new block was rst eliminated with the
pivots found in the previous blocks then with the new pivots in the block itself
after which the result was written to disk Each of the rst four blocks resulted
in a le of   MBytes Notice that one wrong bit either in the dense matrix
or in the intermediate les can render the entire computation worthless For
this reason the dense matrix intentionally contained  spurious dependencies
which were supposed to be found at regular intervals during the elimination
process to signal possible errors
The entire process took  hours on a K MasPar MP
 	 minutes to read
the dense matrix  minutes to write the rst four blocks and  hours for
the eliminations This is better than we had expected

because unlike previous
eliminations most pivot rows had to be read from disk before eliminating with
them and they could not be stored in registers during the elimination All 
spurious dependencies were found at the right moment during the computation
and  true dependencies were found at the end It took a few minutes to
convert the  dependencies modulo  in the dense matrix to dependencies in
the sparse one Computing the pairs x y with x

 y

mod r took a few minutes
per dependency The rst three dependencies led to r    r At  UT on
April   the fourth one led to the factorization r  p  q with p the 
digit
prime
	
 	  
 
 		   	 	 	
 	     	  	 	
 

and q the 
digit prime
 	  	 	 
	 		  	  	
       	 		 	 	 	 
Five of the rst ten dependencies were unlucky It might be interesting to note
that p   



 !p for a 
digit prime !p   	

 "p and a 
digit prime "p
and that q     

   !q for a 
digit prime !q    

   "q and another

digit prime "q We suspect that p    and q    were consciously chosen to
have large prime factors so that r would withstand a Pollard p    factoring

The  hours for the 	   columnmatrix from  extrapolate to 	 

	  

 
 hours
attack The large prime factors of !p   and !q   might have been based on the
widespread belief that they would be necessary to prevent a decryption attempt
using iterated encryption 	 The resistance of r against a Pollard p attack
which had not yet been published by 		 was probably a coincidence p 
   	   	     p and q    

   	  	  	 p
with pj denoting a j
digit prime
 Analysis of the data collected
Let Q  fq  q prime B
 
 q 	 B



mr
q

 g be the set of  	 	 large
primes which can possibly occur in the double partial relations Let pq be the
probability that q 
 Q occurs in a partial relation In  it is shown that t partial
relations can be expected to generate c  t

cycles where c  
P
q Q
pq

 To
be able to predict the number of cycles among partials it is therefore useful to
get more insight in the behavior of pq It has been suggested in  that pq is
proportional to q

 for some positive    In the full paper we will analyse
which  best ts our data and discuss how well the theoretically estimated
number of cycles among the partials agrees with our ndings Furthermore we
will present the 
 
and 

corresponding to p
 
q and p

q where p
 
q is the
probability that q 
 Q occurs as smallest large prime in a double partial and
p

q is the probability that it appears as largest large prime in a double partial
relation
Dierent factorizations with similar s usually have similar cycle
yields
which makes the s good indicators of the cycle
yield Because the behavior
of the s can be derived long before the factorization is complete this might
be helpful to predict the cycle
yield in other factorizations The behavior of the
cycle
yield is of particular interest for future NFS factorizations where relations
can have more than  large primes cf 	 Understanding their cycle
yield is
crucial to be able to predict the run
times cf 
The estimates that were sent to the contributors cf Section  were based
on extrapolations of the cycle
curve Initially a quadratic curve gave a good t
and was therefore used to extrapolate We lost our condence in quadratic ex

trapolation in late December  when the extrapolation predicted that we
would need more than  million relations Fortunately we noticed in January
that a quadratic no longer gave a close t and that the cycle
curve was show

ing stronger than quadratic growth Experiments indicated quite unexpectedly
that a quartic function gave a very good approximation However the residuals
although small were quite well serially correlated which probably implies that
the cycle
curve does not behave as a quartic Since the error terms were rela

tively small and because the rst few extrapolations turned out to be unusually
accurate we kept using the quartic anyway We predicted in early February that
 million relations would suce The quartic extrapolation proved to be very
slightly optimistic  it turned out that we actually needed  million relations
In the full paper we will provide more details and graphs of the actual yields
and of the quadratic and quartic extrapolations
 Resource management
To factor r we assembled the largest collaboration yet seen in computational
number theory and possibly performed the largest single computation ever com

pleted In several important respects the resources we had available were barely
adequate for the task Consequently ingenuity and diplomacy were required for
the successful completion of the project Full details of the resource manage

ment aspects of the computation will be given in the full paper here we give a
summary of the salient points
Based on experience with earlier factorizations especially those in 
and  we could make reasonably precise estimates of the disk space amount of
computation and memory usage which would be required Before we started we
estimated that we would need about  million relations each of which would take
about  bytes to store We knew that a few mips
millenia would be required
We also estimated that the factor base would need to have about   to
  elements implying that the sieving programs would take over  MBytes
of active memory We did not know before we started how many machines and
of what power would be available to us but we did have some encouraging oers
of support It was clear however that an unusually large number of people and
machines would be involved with the project
The rst action was to settle the size of the factor base As explained in 
a gure of about half a million primes was close to optimal A somewhat larger
number would have reduced the theoretical amount of computation required but
we were already using  MBytes of active virtual memory Given that most
of the machines on the Internet have less than  MBytes of physical memory
and many have  or less even  MBytes is uncomfortably large and would
seriously restrict the number of people capable of helping us
Before going public the rst and fourth authors ported the software to as
many dierent kinds of workstations and PCs as were available to us The rst
author persuaded MIT to lend us a le server for the duration This machine was
a DEC  with  MBytes RAM and two later three 	 MBytes disks
MIT systems sta also agreed to perform regular backups of the information on
disk For these reasons MIT was chosen as collection site
Also before the computations started the second and fourth authors wrote
documents explaining what we were proposing to do how we were going to do it
and how to get further information should the reader wish to join in The second
author set up several mailing lists and email aliases for communications to and
from our workers and the four coordinators he also took on the role of front
line
contact person dealing with virtually all the  contributors and many others
who expressed an interest but did not join in for whatever reason
The postings to potential contributors went out on August   to the
number theory net on August  to the cypherpunks and the PGP devel

opment group and on August  to the following newsgroups althackers
altsecurity altsecuritypgp altsecurityripem comparch compsecuritymisc
scicrypt and scimath The initial response to our postings and the number
of incoming relations was suciently encouraging to conclude that the project
would be feasible
Once contributors started oering their services we had to port our software
to their platforms if we had not already done so Although one Unix box is very
much like another there are sucient dierences that we often had to ask our
contributors to perform the port for us and to send back the modications so
that we could pass them on to others with the same platform Our code was run
successfully on machines as disparate as MHz sx PCs and Cray Cs
An attempted port to a Thinking Machines CM
 failed but one US corporation
managed to get the sieving code running on a couple of fax machines#
The relatively severe memory requirements and the commonness of  MBytes
machines gave us a strong incentive to produce memory
frugal variants of the
siever By reducing the sieve batch size and by reading the roots of mr mod the
ps from a le we were able to reduce the space required from the default 
MBytes to  MBytes albeit at a cost of running over twice as slowly However
half a computer is better than none and by allowing more people to take part
we shortened the overall time taken for the sieving phase Even so  MBytes
does not leave much room for an operating system and most of our contributors
with  MBytes machines were only able to run our code overnight
Once we were up to speed we received on average about  thousand relations
per day with peaks of over  thousand during the holiday seasons Daily all
newly received relations that satised  were sorted and merged with older
data faulty or duplicate relations were thrown out This took at most a few
hours per day even when the accumulated data had reached a couple of GBytes
About one relation in ten thousand received was unacceptable in some way Of
these many had suered in transit through mail gateways but we also received a
number of relations intended for another factoring
by
email computation being
run at the same time  these relations were sent on to the correct destination
together with a polite note to suggest that their contributors be informed of
their error
About half
way through the computation it became clear that we would run
out of disk space if we continued to store the relations in plain text Accordingly
the fourth author wrote a simple but ecient compressor and the bulk of the
data was kept in a more compact format Each days data was left as ASCII for
convenience fewer processing programs had to be re
written and a combined
uncompress
sort
merge
compress of the total data set performed every few weeks
as the disk began to get uncomfortably full Unfortunately we did not notice
the disk over$owing in early January  About three weeks data had been
corrupted fortunately the outputs from the daily runs of the email processor
were still on disk so we were able to recover relatively easily
To monitor the progress the fourth author adapted the cycle
counting soft

ware from  to the relatively small workstation we had at MIT Towards the
end of the project this became a challenging task with several GBytes of com

pressed data a graph containing several million nodes edges and components
and a few hundred thousand cycles no disk space to decompress or to write
intermediate les and only a  mips processor with  MBytes of physical
memory Details will be given in the full paper
We have already described in Section  how the quadratic extrapolation
began to indicate that we would need many more relations than we had pre

dicted at the start of the project We became seriously concerned at this point
that we would have diculty in maintaining the interest of our contributors for
several months longer than anticipated Further although we had enough disk
space just# to process  million relations an extra  would have caused us
signicant problems Luckily our discovery of the much more accurate quartic
prediction was made before we told our contributors saving us from worrying
them with a false alarm
The resulting counts were mailed to the contributors each month along with
an estimate of how much more would be needed These reports were also posted
to Usenet as it was found that they were very eective at attracting new con

tributors The estimates were based on extrapolation of the cycle
curve cf Sec

tion 
Some substantial eort had to be devoted to problem solving As our program
had not previously run on certain platforms its portability had not been proven
Two examples will suce One unfortunate contributor discovered that his disk
had lled with over  MBytes of error messages overnight after our program
had run wild We discovered rather bizarre behavior of a particular compiler for
the Intel x  unless the value of a certain variable was printed out the
program would crash unpredictably
 Conclusion
Our Internet contributors were exclusively volunteers donating spare computer
time from overnight and weekend running Although  people and  ma

chines constitute the largest ad hoc multiprocessor so far assembled it is only
a tiny fraction of the size and power of the entire Internet It is dicult to get
even a rough estimate of the potential power available At the time of writing
October  it is thought that there are between  and  million machines on
the Internet it is currently growing at about 
 per month If we assume
conservatively that there are  million machines each of which can average
 mips ie a typical  mips workstation with  availability the potential
power available is around 

mips  about ve times the power of Rivests
hypothetical machine In principle the Internet could have factored r in three
hours# The implementation details are left as an exercise for the reader
Let us attempt to give a more plausible estimate We believe that we could
acquire  thousand machines without superhuman or unethical eorts That
is we would not set free an Internet worm or virus to nd resources for us Many
organizations have several thousand machines each on the net Making use of
their facilities would require skilful diplomacy but should not be impossible
Assuming the  mips average power and a one year elapsed time it is not too
unreasonable to embark on a project which would require half a million mips
years We conclude that 
bit RSA keys are on the brink of vulnerability to
a venerable but robust algorithm However we believe that solving the RSA

challenge is probably the last gasp of an elderly workhorse A credible attack on
a 
bit key would almost certainly use an NFS implementation
However even using NFS to factor a 
bit number would be a non
trivial
undertaking Without falling into the trap of making over
precise estimates of
run
times we can say that the resources required will be well in excess of what
we used to factor a 
bit key If the open Internet were to be used the resource
management would be tricky If an organization were to purchase the hardware
necessary to give an average power of   mips   processors each
rated at  mips  an outlay of several million dollars would be needed As

suming that NFS can be implemented on those machines and assuming that the
matrix step can be performed 
bit keys would take a few months to factor
Nonetheless organizations exist with annual budgets in excess of ten million
dollars and which might regard it to be cost
eective to break 
bit RSA keys
protecting information of particular interest
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